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The Law of the Land: The Evolution of Our Legal System
by Charles Rembar, New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1980.
Pp. 413.
The task of rendering the law a subject reasonably comprehensible is indeed an awesome one. Charles Rembar has produced a
creditable such effort in The Law of the Land: The Evolution of our
Legal System. Rembar, a trial lawyer of no menial significance -among
his more notable defenses have been the "Lady Chatterley's Lover,"1
"Tropic of Cancer"' and "Fanny Hill"' obscenity cases, all in which
the defense prevailed-has tempered a lucid and fluid writing style
with a scholarly knowledge of the law and its origins and has achieved
a result which is both informative and, at times, humorous. The former
characteristic makes the book a product worthy of the investment
in time and money, and the latter maintains the reader's interest so
that such will not have been wasted.
The book is highly readable and entertaining, in particular with
regard to the author's almost uncanny grasp of the niceties of the
early English law. There are fourteen easily segmented chapters dealing with such areas as evidence, equity, the "old New Pleading" (an
enlightening progression of the simplification in pleading requirements), the rights of the criminally accused, and the inception of trial
by jury. The common law versus statutory law, criminal versus civil,
procedure versus substantive distinctions are explained early in the
book in a manner which should appeal to the lay reader as well as
refresh the lawyer. The primitive modes of dealing with transgressors
of the law, both civil and criminal-hue and cry, feud, and ordeal and
compurgation, all methods conducted by the populace who assumed
responsibility of assuring that "justice" was done-are discussed at
length with examples interspersed so that each is clarified. Rembar
distinguishes among the early writs of debt, detinue, contract and
trespass (the "preferred" writ) and expounds upon our English development: from the thirteenth century addition of statutory law to the
existing judicial system upon the establishment of Parliament and its
flourishing under Edward I,to the eighteenth century's introduction
of the default judgment, up to the abolishment by the 1848 New York
state legislature and the later Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of
1. Grove Press, Inc. et al. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
2. Atty. Gen'l v. The Book Named "Tropic of Cancer", 184 N.E.2d 328 (Mass.
1962).
3.

Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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the more restrictive forms of pleading. He elucidates many fundamental differences in American and British law, e.g., the inability of an
English court to declare an act of Parliament unconstitutional and the
absence of a written constitution in Great Britain.
An elaborate discussion of the various rules of evidence and the
reasons for each is perhaps the high point of the book. The chapter
on the development of the jury and a critique of the present day
system is excellent. Occasionally, the author's factual and historical
detail is complemented by his personal views, which he offers in his
analysis of a jury's effectiveness: Rembar recommends the retention
of the jury system only in criminal litigation. And he concludes the
American legal system to be uniquely characterized by two distinctive benefits to the criminal defendant: the presumption of innocence
and the requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Two areas of the author's personal perceptions are particularly
apparent: (1) his abhorrence of the United States Supreme Court's
expansion of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech
to areas beyond what he feels the drafters of the Bill of Rights
envisioned.4 This view comes as somewhat of a surprise when expressed by one who had successfully argued the cause of allegedly
obscene works on the ground that the writers and producers were
exercising this constitutional right.5 One puzzling feature was Rembar's mention of the Supreme Court's 1957 Roth6 decision with which
his subsequent defense of "Lady Chatterley" differed, without mentioning the stricter test later adopted by the Court The Roth Court
condemned any work whose dominant appeal was to the reader's or
viewer's "prurient interest,"9 but provided that its salvation could
nonetheless be achieved by a showing of any "social redeeming

4. See, e.g., C. REMBAR, LAW OF THE LAND, 265, 315. For example, the author
disagrees with decisions such as the one which held that advertising by lawyers is
speech protected by the First Amendment (see REMBAR, at 265). And he strongly
berates a 1976 Supreme Court decision holding unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds portions of a federal statute which limited the use of money in federal elections. Rembar's analysis of this latter holding is that the Court thereby effectively
guarantees a "rich man . . . a greater voice in government than a poor man," which
he feels may be "fact, but it is not law." REMBAR at 394.
5. Rembar apparently advocates the extension of the First Amendment protection only to those areas expressly stated-speech, press, and religion-but, where
applicable, regards this protection as complete and unfettered.
6. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7. Rembar deems Roth a "thumping defeat for libertarians." REMBAR at 327.
8. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
9. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
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value,""0 no matter how trivial. Rembar obviously felt this restriction
on the freedom of speech to have been excessive," but he does not
seize upon the opportunity to comment upon the stricter standard
adopted by the Court in the 1973 Miller decision. 2 Although "Lady
Chatterley" was in the interim between those two decisions when Roth
was indeed the prevailing authority, the reader wonders why Rembar
does not chastize the Miller test that a work is obscene unless the
degree of "literary, artistic, political or scientific" value in a challenged
work is "serious.""' At any rate, his distaste for the expansion of areas
protected by the First Amendment and his impregnable position of
its strength in areas where applicable appear anomalous. And the
reader is left to ponder why he did not comment upon the relatively
illimitable restrictive effect of Miller, which should have served to
compound his distress over the Roth restriction. Rembar's defense in
"Lady Chatterley" would unquestionably have failed under the more
stringent Miller test thereafter adopted. (2) Rembar's more-thanoccasional indication of his negative subjective opinion of former President Nixon is expressed, albeit with levity. He calls the Nixon administration "anti-intellectual"" and disapprovingly refers to the disregard
by Nixon and his predecessors of the exclusive right of Congress to
declare war, designating them, respectively, "King John and King
Richard and King Lyndon.""5 He further uses Nixon's predating of
his gift of papers to exemplify a form of legal fiction used in a
fraudulent manner, as contrasted with the use of such fiction purposefully (an example of the latter was the legal presumption of the
king's omnipresence during the Middle Ages, in order to allow a
litigant to proceed with criminal prosecution in the king's absence,
since the presence of the royal personage was traditionally required).
10. "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance ... have
the full protection of the guarantees of the First Amendment. . . . But implicit in
the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance." Id. at 484-5.
11. "The Roth case did not, could not, mean what it seemed to mean." REMBAR at 328. Rembar argued in "Lady Chatterley," supra note 1, that the "First Amendment protected any work that had discernible social value, no matter how lustful or
prurient, no matter how offensive, no matter how violative of community standards."
REMBAR at 328.
12. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). This test later adopted by the
Supreme Court renders the Roth test pale in comparison. See infra note 13.
13. Id. at 25. The Court in Miller specifically rejected the "utterly without
redeeming social value" test which Rembar had successfully used in the "Fanny Hill"
case, Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966), and substituted instead the
requirement that the social value be significant, or "serious."
14. REMBAR at 199.
15. Id. at 290.
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And Rembar's premise that the law is generally recognized and
respected is qualified by his statement that there are some exceptional officials who transgress, such transgressions being illustrated
by Nixon's "simple outlawry.""6
At times, the historical data does become almost a dissertation,
and the reader may tend to feel he has reverted to a college European
history or law school legal history course. Mr. Rembar's research in
the piecemeal establishment of our nation's judicial system has surely
been exhaustive, and certainly no lawyer can read his book without
having learned much about his profession's development. As a research
vehicle, the chapter on evidence is perhaps the most fruitful and the
chapter on the complexity of pleading which addresses the tendency
of many lawyers to make work in order to maximize fees, as well
as the author's feeling that the bar is publicly obligated to provide
citizens with out-of-court legal advice free of charge, and his opinion
that it is necessary for lawyers to act professionally beyond reproach
("slightly better [than most professional groups] is not enough"1 ) is
one every lawyer would do well to digest. He further presents a plausible, but arguable, proposition that the government should bear the
expense of paying lawyers who provide actual litigation services for
indigent persons. The book is replete with such controversial positions that would provide inventive topics for debate.
Perhaps the theme of the book is best set forth in the final
sentence. "Its [the law's] task is to draw generally sensible lines within
the infinite shades of circumstance that constitute our world."18
Rembar, who is quite evidently fascinated with the subject matter
of his profession, has produced a laudable work that will enlighten
many a layman and inspire many a practitioner as to the profoundity
and virtues of those "sensible lines."
Carol D. Rasnic*
16. Id. at 407.
17. Id. at 266.
18. Id. at 213.
* Assistant Professor of Business Law and Labor Law, Virginia Commonwealth University; B.A., University of Kentucky, 1963; LL.B., Vanderbilt University, 1965; Admitted to Tennessee (1965) and Virginia (1976) Bars.
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